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Introduction: Finding the Neural Correlates of Consciousness Through a 
Representationalist Analysis 
 
Why Is a Representationalist Analysis Useful? 
In this chapter I will briefly sketch the outline of a representationalist theory of 
subjective experience. (See also Metzinger 1993, forthcoming). A representationalist 
theory is one that chooses to analyze its target properties – those aspects of the 
domain which eventually are to be explained – on a certain level of description: by 
describing conscious systems as representational systems and conscious states as 
representational states, one hopes to achieve progress with regard to the relevant 
properties. This first background assumption is shared by many philosophers today 
(see, e.g., Dretske 1995; Lycan 1996; Metzinger 1993; Tye 1995), and one may interpret 
it as a weak version of Brentano’s intentionalism. William Lycan (e.g., 1996: 11) has 
called it the “hegemony of representation”: The explanatory base for all mental 
properties is formed by a definite, exhaustive set of functional and representational 
                                                 
1 This is an extended and slightly revised version of a book chapter that first appeared in T. Metzinger (2000), 
ed., Neural Correlates of Consciousness – Empirical and Conceptual Questions. Cambridge, AM: MIT Press. 
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properties of the class of systems under investigation. However, if in this way one 
also aims at achieving genuine scientific progress by naturalizing classical theoretical 
problems, these have to be transformed into an empirically tractable form. It is 
therefore vital that the underlying theory of representational content is itself 
empirically plausible, open to data-driven conceptual changes, and limited to a 
specific domain (Churchland 1989; Clark 1989). One such domain are biological 
nervous systems, a more specific domain would be human brains in waking or 
dream states. What, then, are the target properties of our domain and how are they to 
be treated? 
Table 20.1 shows the seven most important theoretical problems connected with 
conscious experience, in terms of phenomenological constrains imposed on any 
representationalist theory of consciousness. 

According to this model, the typical way of generating an empirical research 
program in interdisciplinary cooperation would consist in moving through one of the 
rows in the table from left to right. When confronted with a conceptual interpretation 
of a certain element of subjective experience, the job would first consist in analyzing 
this element as a form of representational content, generated and utilized by the 
system in interaction with its environment. The second step would be an attempt to 
give a functional description of the relevant content-bearing states in the system, by 
individuating them through their causal role. This opens the functional level of 
analysis, on which the “functional correlates” of phenomenal experience have to be 
specified. As soon as the intended class of systems (e.g., humans, macaques, or 
certain artificial systems) has been delimited, experimental approaches can proceed 
to isolate the minimal set of basic physical properties (e.g., the neural correlates) that 
the system needs in order to exhibit the target properties by nomological necessity. In 
this way domain-specific reductive explanations become possible. 
Of course, real-world cooperation between disciplines is much more complex. For 
instance, the rows shown above can also be read from right to left: Differentiated 
research into the physical correlates of phenomenal states can draw our attention to 
fine-grained differences in the actual functional role of these correlates. This may 
eventually lead us to being able to describe our conscious experience in a more fine-
grained manner, thereby increasing the amount of information conveyed when 
speaking about our own introspective experience. In other words, one way of 
 5
making progress can consist in increasing the number of rows in the left column.2 
There may also be oscillations between neighboring columns, as when philosophers 
discuss the adequacy of a representationalist conceptualization of experiential 
content, or when neuroscientists have doubts about a specific functional analysis 
offered by researchers in classical AI or cognitive science. And real-life science 
progresses through multiple loops:  There are many trajectories through the problem 
landscape and across levels of description, and one and the same line of inquiry may 
return to the same vicinity again and again, at a slightly different angle. 
For a philosopher, attempting to contribute to a reductive explanation of 
consciousness is never an ideology or an emotional substitute for religion. If it turns 
out that there are principled reasons why important features of subjective experience 
can never be epistemically grasped through a system of interdisciplinary cooperation 
like the one sketched above, she will be quite happy with this result, because the 
philosopher will then have achieved what she has always aimed at in the first place: 
epistemic progress, a growth of knowledge. All she will insist on is that those 
elements of consciousness purportedly resistant to any reductive approach are 
described with a maximum of conceptual clarity. So even antireductionists should, if 
only as a heuristic strategy, follow a reductionist methodology (Walter 1998). 
                                                 
2  This, of course, is a point Paul Churchland has often made: “I suggest, then, that those of us who prize the flux 
and content of our subjective phenomenological experience need not view the advance of materialist 
neuroscience with fear and foreboding. Quite the contrary. The genuine arrival of a materialist kinematics and 
dynamics for psychological states and cognitive processes will constitute not a gloom in which our inner life is 
suppressed or eclipsed, but rather a dawning, in which its marvelous intricacies are finally revealed - most 
notably, if we apply [it] ourselves, in direct self-conscious introspection.” See Churchland 1989: 66. 
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In this essay I will select only one aspect of phenomenal experience, its 
perspectivalness. This very last aspect mentioned in the table above is crucial for 
interdisciplinary research programs, because it poses the greatest methodological 
and epistemological problems. Any serious scientific approach to consciousness will 
have to rely entirely on objective, third-person criteria for the ascription of 
phenomenal states to a given system. How, then, could it ever do justice to the 
essentially subjective, first-person character of the phenomenon? (See Metzinger 
1993, 1996; Nagel 1974, 1986) Can the subjectivity of the target phenomenon itself 
ever be turned into an explanandum for the hard sciences? 
 
Analysanda and Explananda: What Does the Subjectivity of Subjective Experience 
Consist in? 
This could work only if, first of all, the concept of a “first-person perspective” is 
clarified in a way that makes the corresponding phenomenon empirically tractable. 
Our starting point therefore is an analysandum, a certain allegedly self-evident 
manner of speaking about ourselves and the structure of our conscious experiences. 
In order for this analysandum to be transformed into a set of experimentally tractable 
explananda, we have to choose a suitable level of description. My first claim would be 
that whenever we have in the past been speaking about the subjectivity of 
phenomenal experience in terms of having an experiential “first-person perspective,” 
we have merely been employing a very soft “visuogrammatical” metaphor. Our 
visual space, as a matter of contingent, trivial fact, possesses a perspectival, 
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geometrical structure:3 This is the spatial part of the metaphor, which originates in 
the folk phenomenology of visual experience. 
Then there is another, more abstract element of our metaphor: Self-ascriptions – for 
instance, of psychological properties – follow a certain logic; they take place from a 
grammatical “first-person” perspective. This is the grammatical aspect of the 
analogy, and prominent philosophers have in the past analyzed the underlying logic 
a lot (e.g., Castañeda 1966; Chisholm 1981; Lewis 1979; Perry 1993; Shoemaker 1996). 
However, if you want to understand how this logic of conceptual self-reference could 
ever come about, what our soft visuogrammatical metaphor actually refers to, you 
have to go much deeper: We have to understand what the deep representational 
structure is that enables beings like ourselves to pose philosophical questions of this 
type in the first place. Why do human beings employ visual metaphors in picking 
out global properties of their experiential space and in trying to understand the 
underlying logic of their linguistic abilities, like the self-ascription of psychological 
properties? What are the necessary and sufficient conditions for any representational 
system, when trying to understand its own mental properties, to run into the 
problem of the “immunity to error of misidentification,” to eventually start 
wondering about “essential indexicals,” “de-se-attitudes,” or “objective selves”? 
Which class of representational architectures will inevitably lead all systems, that 
realize this architecture, into the theoretical landscape sketched at the beginning of 
this introduction? In order to answer this more fundamental question, on needs to 
                                                 
3 Although this structure may already contain primitive, self-specifying information. See especially Bermúdez 
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produce an informative account of the neural and functional correlates of three very 
special phenomenal properties. To understand subjectivity on the logical, the 
epistemic or metaphysical level, one has to investigate what the phenomenal first-
person perspective is.  
A Representationalist Analysis of the Phenomenal First-Person Perspective 
 
Three Phenomenal Target Properties 
The “phenomenal first-person perspective” is one of the most fascinating natural 
phenomena we know, and in a certain sense we are this phenomenon ourselves: The 
essence of being a person seems to consist in the potential for being a conscious 
subject. It consists of three phenomenological target properties that in their 
conceptual interpretation constitute three different aspects of one and the same 
problem: 
(1) Mineness: a higher-order property of particular forms of phenomenal content. Here 
are some typical examples of how we refer to these properties in folk psychological 
contexts: I experience my leg subjectively as always having belonged to me; I always 
experience my thoughts, my focal attention, and my emotions as part of my own 
consciousness; voluntary acts are initiated by myself. 
(2) Selfhood (“prereflexive self-intimacy”): the phenomenal target property. Again, let 
us look at some examples of how we usually attempt to linguistically describe the 
phenomenal content of the representational states underlying these properties: I am 
                                                                                                                                                        
1998: chap.5. 
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someone; I experience myself as being identical through time; the contents of my 
phenomenal self-consciousness form a coherent whole; before initiating any 
intellectual operations, and independent of them, I am already “directly” acquainted 
with the contents of my self-consciousness. 
What we frequently just call “the self” in a folk-psychological context is the 
phenomenal self: the content of self-consciousness, as given in subjective experience. 
We are therefore confronted with a higher-order phenomenal property that is 
constituted by different and constantly changing types of phenomenal content. Let us 
call this property “selfhood” or, to use a more technical term, “prereflexive self-
intimacy” (e.g., Frank 1991). The phenomenal self arguably is the theoretically most 
interesting form of phenomenal content because, among other reasons, it endows our 
mental space with two highly interesting structural characteristics: centeredness and 
perspectivalness. As long as there is a phenomenal self, our conscious model of the 
world is a functionally centered model and is tied to what in philosophy of mind is 
called the “first-person perspective.” 
(3) Perspectivalness: a global, structural property of phenomenal space as a whole. It 
possesses an immovable center. According to subjective experience, the overall 
dynamics within this space is organized around a supramodal point of view. The 
phenomenal self is this center.  And at this stage the conflict between first-person and 
third-person descriptions of our target properties becomes very obvious. This is what 
constitutes the philosophical puzzle: I am this center myself; to be phenomenally 
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aware means to possess an inward perspective and to take this perspective on in the 
subjective experience of the world and of one’s own mental states. 
So phenomenal subjectivity – as opposed to subjectivity in an epistemological or 
ontological sense – simply amounts to the fact that under standard conditions, the 
dynamics of conscious experience unfolds in a space that is centered on a singular, 
temporally extended experiential self. What now has to be achieved is a 
representational and a functional analysis of these properties. The pivotal question is 
What is the minimal set of functional and representational properties that an 
information-processing system must possess in order to exemplify the phenomenal 
properties under investigation? Which of these low-level properties are necessary, 
and which are sufficient? What, precisely, does it mean for such a system to take a 
phenomenal first-person perspective on the world and on its own mental states? 
 
Step 1: What Is a Self-Model? 
 
The first step of my analysis consists in introducing a new theoretical entity: the 
phenomenal self-model. It forms the representational instantiation basis of the 
phenomenal properties to be explained. The content of the phenomenal self-model, 
again, is what we often call “the self” in folk-psychological contexts; its content is the 
content of self-consciousness, bodily, emotional, and cognitive. My claim is that – 
ontologically speaking – no such things as selves exist in the world. What actually 
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exists is a special kind of self-models and their contents, and this content makes us 
believe that we actually do have, or are identical to, a self. 
The following can be said of the self-model: 
! The self-model is an episodically active representational entity, the content of 
which is formed solely by properties of the system itself. 
! A self-model can be described on multiple, subpersonal levels. For instance, we 
might describe it as an activation vector or as a trajectory through some suitable 
state-space.  A trivial but important background assumption is that, in our own case, 
it also possesses a true neurobiological description, for instance, as a complex neural 
activation pattern with a certain temporal fine structure. On a more abstract level the 
same pattern of physiological activity can also be described as a complex functional 
state. 
! The phenomenal self-model is that partition of the presently active mental self-
model which is currently embedded in the highest-order integrated structure, the 
global model of the world (see, e.g., Yates 1975; Baars 1988; see also row 4 of table 
20.1). In other words, nonconscious but causally active self-models (or nonconscious 
subregions of such models) may exist (see also chapter 6 in this volume). 
! In our own case the phenomenal self-model is a plastic, multimodal structure that 
is plausibly based on an innate and “hardwired” model of the spatial properties of 
the system (e.g., a “long-term body image”; see section “The Central Theoretical 
Problem on the Functional Level of Description,” below, and O’Shaughnessy 1995; 
Bermúdez 1998; Damasio 1994; Kinsbourne 1995; Metzinger 1993, 2001), while being 
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functionally rooted in elementary bioregulatory processes; e.g., those systems in the 
upper brain stem and hypothalamus achieving homeostasis and the stability of the 
internal chemical milieu (see chapter 7 and Damasio 1999). The content of this 
underlying form of primitive self-awareness is nonconceptual and subdoxastic.4 
In order to better understand what a self-model actually is, you can develop a 
parallel description on the functional level of analysis. An active self-model is the 
physical realization of a subpersonal functional state. It plays a certain causal role; 
that is, under an analytical perspective it represents a discrete set of causal relations. 
It is likely that the neural microevents constituting the relevant causal matrix within 
the system have to be individuated on a very fine-grained, subsymbolic level 
including the temporal structure of these events (see Singer 1993, 1994; and especially 
chapter 8 in this volume). However, just to illustrate the core idea, you could also 
take a classical cognitivist perspective. Then the self-model could be described as a 
transient computational module, episodically activated by the system in order to 
regulate its interaction with the environment.5 
                                                 
4 Higher-order, conceptually mediated forms of self-consciousness are always anchored in more primitive forms 
of noncategorizable, cognitively unavailable forms of content (from which they very likely have developed: see 
Bermúdez 1998; Metzinger 1993). It is exciting to see how currently the best philosophical theorists working on 
analytical theories of self-representation and self-consciousness are starting to do justice to the importance of 
bodily awareness in the constitution of higher-level forms of subjectivity (see, e.g., Bermúdez 1998 or Cassam 
1997). However, one should be careful as not to introduce a principled distinction (and hence a new dualism 
between reified conceptual and nonconceptual forms of content) at this point. Content is not a mysterious type of 
thing, but an abstract property of a highly fluid and complex cognitive dynamics, and the best empirically 
plausible models of representational content we have at this point clearly suggest the existence of a continuum 
reaching from simple sensory content to more abstract, concept-like forms (see Churchland 1998: 32). I would 
like to suggest that we will find exactly such a continuum in the case of self-representation as well. 
5 This, of course, is just another way of describing what happens when you wake up in the morning. There is a 
formal proof that every regulator of a complex system will automatically become a model of that system. See 
Conant and Ashby 1970. 
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The next step in defining the working concept of a self-model consists in integrating 
the biological history of our target phenomenon into the explanatory base. One may 
plausibly assume that it was, very obviously, adaptive to have something like a partly 
veridical, functionally active self-representation. Philosophers call this theoretical 
move a “teleofunctionalist assumption”: The development and the activation of this 
neurocomputational module plays a role for the system. The functional properties of 
the self-model possess a true evolutionary description; that is, it is a weapon that was 
invented and optimized in the course of a “cognitive arms race” (a very apt and 
unromantic metaphor coined by Andy Clark; see Dennett 1987; Lycan 1996; Clark 
1989, p. 62). The functional instantiation basis for a phenomenal first-person 
perspective, then, is a specific cognitive achievement: the capacity to open and 
employ centered representational spaces, to operate under egocentric world models. 
This amounts to the central necessary6 (but not sufficient7) condition in ascribing 
subjective experience to a given system: weak subjectivity1 – phenomenal subjectivity 
                                                 
6 In table 20.1 I have tried to give an overview of what I think are the seven most important phenomenological 
characteristics of subjective states. For each case, a convincing representationalist analysis could constitute 
another necessary, but not sufficient, ascription criterion for conscious experience in standard cases. However, 
consciousness is such a rich and complex phenomenon that counter examples can always be found if our domain 
is sufficiently wide (e.g., considering case studies from clinical neuropsychology, see Metzinger forthcoming). 
Therefore, my goal in this paper is rather modest: I am not claiming that even if we had all seven criteria (let’s 
call them weak subjectivity 1–7) clearly defined in a conceptually convincing and empirically contentful manner, 
the conjunction of these criteria would already constitute a necessary condition. I am not even claiming that the 
criterion investigated here is a necessary criterion in a strict analytical sense (see note 6).  
The reason for concentrating on perspectivalness and self-representation are in part philosophical and in part 
methodological (see the section “Step 5”). From a philosophical perspective, for many reasons the subjectivity of 
our target phenomenon is arguably the most interesting aspect of the problem. If one is interested in generating 
empirical research programs, then the neural correlates of phenomenal self-modelling are especially interesting, 
because under standard conditions, they will constitute the most invariant aspect of state-space. 
7 Note that in certain contexts this condition may not even be a necessary condition for the ascription of 
phenomenal experience in general: If we allow for noncentered, selfless states of phenomenal experience (e.g., in 
psychiatric cases like full depersonalization or during some classes of mystical or religious experiences), then we 
will have to conceptually describe these state classes as aperspectival or nonsubjective varieties of conscious 
experience. As exclusively internal representations, such states may still be “subjective” from an epistemological 
perspective (and in a quite weak sense), but they are nonsubjective on a phenomenological level of description. 
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(a subsymbolic, nonconceptual first-person perspective) is a property that is 
instantiated only if the system in question activates a coherent self-model and 
embeds this into its global model of the world. 
Before going on, let us take a short break and look at two examples. They will serve 
to illustrate the concept of a phenomenal self-model by some anecdotal evidence. 
Astronauts, after some time in space, tend to lose their phenomenal body axis, the 
subjective feeling of where the top and where the bottom of their body is. When 
trying to eat, for instance, this can be uncomfortable. Every astronaut knows how to 
help his buddy: He briefly touches the sole of his partner’s foot, and instantly his 
phenomenal body image will lock into a subjective “top-bottom-axis” again. Every 
astronaut also knows how to tease his partner: by tapping his head, thereby 
reversing the spatial frame of reference.  
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This shows that the self-model of human beings is a virtual model which, if 
underdetermined by internally generated input (i.e., from gravitational acceleration 
affecting the maculae utriculi and sacculi in the vestibular organ), is highly context-
dependent: Its content is a possibility and not a reality. Just as the phenomenal 
properties of external experience are properties of virtual objects, so the properties 
exemplified in inner experience are those of a virtual subject. Its content is simply the 
best hypothesis about the current state of the system, given all constraints and 
information resources currently available. Interestingly – and this seems to be one of 
the core characteristics of phenomenal experience – this possibility is depicted as a 
reality, as an untranscendable presence (see section “Step 3: Transparency and Naive 
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Realism,” below). The actuality of situated self-awareness is a virtual form of 
actuality.8 
A second, even more vivid example of what is meant by the concept of a phenomenal 
self-model is demonstrated in Vilayanur Ramachandran’s intriguing experiments on 
mirror-induced synesthesia and illusory movements in phantom limbs (see 
Ramachandran and Rogers-Ramachandran 1996; see also Ramachandran and 
Blakeslee 1998: 46pp). Phantom limbs are subjectively experienced limbs that 
typically remain after the loss of an arm or a hand as the result of an accident or 
surgical amputation (we will return to phantom limbs in the section “The Central 
Problem on the Functional Level of Description,” below). In some situations, such as 
following a nontraumatic surgical amputation, patients are subjectively able to 
volitionally control and move their phantom limbs. The neurofunctional correlate of 
this phenomenal configuration could be that – since there is no contradictory 
feedback from the amputated limb – motor commands originating in motor cortex 
are still continuously monitored by the parietal lobes and thereby integrated into that 
part of the self-model which serves as an internal motor emulator (see Grush 1997, 
1998: 174; Ramachandran and Rogers-Ramachandran 1996: 378; Metzinger 2001, 
chap. 7; for a recent review see Ramachandran and Hirstein 1998). In other situations, 
however, subjective motility and control over the phantom limb can be lost. Such a 
configuration may arise because of a preamputational paralysis due to peripheral 
                                                 
8  I think that “virtual reality” is the best technological metaphor which is currently available as a source for 
generating new theoretical intuitions. In the context of this paper, heuristically the most interesting concept may 
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nerve lesions or to a prolonged absence of confirming proprioceptive and kinesthetic 
feedback. The result on the phenomenal level of representation is a paralyzed 
phantom limb. 
Ramachandran and colleagues constructed a “virtual reality box” by placing a 
vertical mirror inside a cardboard box with the top of the box removed. Two holes in 
the front of the box enabled the patient to insert his real and his phantom arm. A 
patient suffering from a paralyzed phantom limb for many years was then asked to 
view the reflection of his normal hand in the mirror, thus – on the level of visual 
input – creating the illusion of observing two hands, when in fact he was seeing only 
the mirror reflection of the intact hand. What would happen to the content of the 
phenomenal self-model when the subject was asked to try to make bilateral, mirror-
symmetric movements? Ramachandran describes one typical outcome of the 
experiment: 
                                                                                                                                                        
be that of “full immersion.” Here, my own ideas converge strongly with those of Antti Revonsuo. See Revonsuo 
1995; and chapter 4 in this volume. 
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I asked Philip to place his right hand on the right side of the mirror in the box and 
imagine that his left hand (the phantom) was on the left side. “I want you to move 
your right and left arms simultaneously,” I instructed.  
“Oh, I can’t do that,” said Philip. “I can move my right arm but my left arm is frozen. 
Every morning, when I get up, I try to move my phantom because it’s in this funny 
position and I feel that moving it might help relieve the pain. But,” he said, looking 
down at his invisible arm, “I never have been able to generate a flicker of movement 
in it.”  
“Okay, Philip, try anyway.”  
Philip rotated his body, shifting his shoulder, to “insert” his lifeless phantom into the 
box. Then he put his right hand on the other side of the mirror and attempted to make 
synchronous movements. As he gazed into the mirror, he gasped and then cried out, 
“Oh, my God! Oh, my God, doctor! This is unbelievable. It’s mind-boggling!” He was 
jumping up and down like a kid. “My left arm is plugged in again. It’s as if I’m in the 
past. All these memories from so many years ago are flooding back into my mind. I 
can move my arm again. I can feel my elbow moving, my wrist moving. It’s all 
moving again.”  
After he calmed down a little I said, “Okay, Philip, now close your eyes.”  
“Oh, my,” he said, clearly disappointed. “It’s frozen again. I feel my right hand 
moving, but there’s no movement in the phantom.”  
“Open your eyes.”  
“Oh, yes, now it’s moving again.”9 
 
 
                                                 
9 See Ramachandran and Blakeslee 1998: 47. For clinical and experimental details, see Ramachandran and 
Rogers-Ramachandran 1996. I am very grateful to Vilayanur Ramchandran for the color photograph inserted 
above. 
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By now it should have become clear how these data serve to illustrate the new 
concept I have introduced: What is moving in this experiment is the phenomenal 
self-model. The sudden occurrence of kinesthetic qualia in the degraded subspace of 
the self-model was made possible by installing a second and perfectly superimposed 
source of “virtual information,” restoring, as it were, the visual mode of self-
representation and thereby making this information volitionally available. Once 
again, this experiment nicely demonstrates how phenomenal properties are 
determined “from below,” by functional and representational properties. 
 
Step ２: Representationalist Analysis of the Target Properties 
 
The Phenomenal Property of “Mineness” Now that the basic explanatory concept has 
been introduced, one can start developing an analysis of the target properties. Let us 
turn to the first target property, the phenomenal quality of “mineness.” On a 
functional level of description, it is clear that it must be intimately associated with 
what is very likely the most fundamental partitioning of the neurocomputational 
state-space underlying conscious experience: the emergence of a self-world border. 
On the representational level of description there will be a simple and 
straightforward assumption that generates a large number of testable and more 
differentiated hypotheses. All representational states, which are being embedded 
into the currently active phenomenal self-model, gain the additional higher-order 
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property of phenomenal mineness. Mineness therefore is a prereflexive, 
nonconceptual sense of ownership (e.g., Martin 1995; Bermúdez 1998).  If the 
underlying integration process is being disturbed, different neuropsychological 
syndromes or altered states of consciousness result. Here are some examples: 
! Consciously experienced thoughts are not my thoughts any more: schizophrenia. 
! My leg is not my leg any more: unilateral hemi-neglect. 
! My arm acts without my control: alien hand syndrome. 
! I am a robot; I am transformed into a puppet; volitional acts are not my own 
volitional acts anymore: depersonalization.10  
! I am the whole world, all events in the world are being initiated and controlled by 
my own volitional acts: mania. 
What could be a more complex phenomenon than conscious experience? An 
empirically founded philosophical theory will eventually have to do full justice to the 
depth and complex topology of our phenomenal state-space. Historical experience in 
science has shown that one of the most promising general research heuristics in 
understanding a complex phenomenon consists in analyzing borderline cases and 
impoverished variations of it. Nonstandard situations in complex domains help us in 
pointing out implicit assumptions and deficits in existing theories, as well as intuitive 
fallacies. Let us therefore briefly take a closer look at these examples. (I discuss more 
of such examples in Metzinger 1993, 1996, 2001). 
                                                 
10 Depersonalization is here understood as the loss of phenomenal agenthood, namely, the specific form of 
phenomenal content that Karl Jaspers called “Vollzugsbewußtsein” (executive consciousness). 
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! Schizophrenia is, on the level of phenomenal content, usually characterized by 
phenomena such as thought insertion, verbal-auditory hallucinations, or delusions of 
control. Thought insertion can be representationally analyzed as a situation where 
the content of currently active cognitive states and processes can not be integrated 
into the self-model, and therefore must be represented as external. Nevertheless, 
such non-subjective thoughts are encoded as an element of objective reality, and their 
phenomenal presence (see table 20.1, rows 3 and 4) cannot be transcended by the 
experiential subject. If, as in hearing voices, internal speech production cannot be 
representationally integrated into the conscious self, a global phenomenal model of 
reality will emerge in which external voices are heard. The interesting phenomenon 
here seems to be the additional “pseudosensory” character of such hallucinations. 
Possibly they depend on an internal emulator for the generation of coherent speech 
acts, which, in the schizophrenic, transforms an efference copy of motor speech 
commands, used as input for an internal model of the ongoing process of speech 
production, into auditory format (Frith 1996; see also Grush 1997, 1998).  
In regard to the third type of deficit classically associated with schizophrenia, 
according to the model here proposed, delusions of external control arise if the 
volitional acts preceding external motor behavior of the patient are no longer 
integrated into a phenomenal self-model. The attribution of such disconnected 
intentions to an external person, visible or invisible, may be a confabulatory reaction 
of the brain, still desperately trying to maximize the overall coherence of its model of 
reality. In those cases, where another person is experienced as the cause of one’s own 
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bodily actions, this may simply be the most economical way to still represent such 
actions as caused by mental events (i.e., to preserve a personal-level representation of 
such events). If a circumscribed neural module for “theory-of-mind” ascriptions 
should exist, it is well conceivable that such a module suffers from functional 
dedifferentiation (see Daprati et al. 1997; Frith 1996; for a more detailed philosophical 
interpretation of empirical data, see chapter 21 in this volume).11  
A self-model is important in enabling a system to represent itself to itself as an agent. 
If this system possesses the physical resources to activate abstract, allocentric 
representations of actions and action goals, then it also possesses one of the most 
important building blocks for language acquisition and social cognition (see chapter 
22 in this volume). However, it also faces new computational tasks: It now has to 
reliably differentiate between own and foreign actions. It has to find a reliable way of 
integrating only the right subset of currently active goal and action representations 
into its self-model. Cortical activity in the representation of own and foreign actions 
clearly overlaps and, interestingly, non-schizophrenic subjects are not able to 
phenomenally represent the relevant signals generated by their own limb 
movements (Georgieff and Jeannerod 1998).  
Action-relative information seems to be coded in two pathways in systems like 
ourselves, because the action representation via the phenomenal self-model does not 
                                                 
11 Frith (1996: 1509) points out that attributions of heard voices to external agents are more strongly correlated 
to current delusions than to actually occurring hallucinations, and therefore are in some sense independent from 
the tendency to phenomenally represent self-generated events as external. McKenna, McKay, Law (1986) offer a 
case study and a number of considerations concerning the clinical concept of schizophrenia that may be helpful 
for philosophers. 
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depend on the same information that is used in generating automatic actions. In 
other words, the capacity to differentiate between first-person and third-person 
actions utilizing proprioceptive, endogenous signals is itself not localized on the 
phenomenal level, is not being carried out through accessing phenomenally available 
information. What actually enters into phenomenal self-experience may just be the 
global state of a comparator module (Georgieff and Jeannerod 1998). Therefore, two 
major classes of hallucinations exist: perceptions without objects and actions 
(including cognitive actions) without subjects. We do not yet know anything about 
the detailed mechanisms generating the corresponding classes of phenomenal states 
(the medial prefrontal area may constitute a major component of their neural 
correlate; see Frith 1996). However, it is conceivable that a functional 
dedifferentiation of the mechanism which integrates action representations into the 
self-model as intended or as imagined actions, versus leaving them in a more abstract, 
allocentric status as elements of the external world model (and therefore only as 
observed actions), leads to the pathological phenomenology in question. 
The neural correlates of this type of deviant representational dynamics are slowly 
beginning to emerge. They seem to be related to hyperactivational states in the right 
inferior parietal lobule (Brodmann area 40) and the cingulate gyrus (e.g., Spence et al. 
1997). Interestingly, what in scientific practice leads us from the representational 
analysis of such uncommon classes of phenomenal states to the delineation of their 
physical correlates, is imaging their functional correlates. An important aspect of 
these functional correlates seems to consist in disordered ways of making the 
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structure of external and internal bodily space available for the system and in deficits 
of the internal monitoring of ongoing motor acts (Spence et al. 1997). 
! Alien hand syndrome (Goldstein 1908; Brion and Jedynak 1972) is characterized 
by a global experiential state in which the patient typically is well aware of complex, 
observable movements carried out by the nondominant hand, while at the same time 
experiencing no corresponding volitional acts. Subjectively (as well as functionally) 
the arm is “out of control,” with a sense of intermanual conflict. On the other hand, 
many such arm movements clearly seem to be goal-directed actions, although no 
such goal representation is available either on the phenomenal level in general or on 
the level of conscious self-representation. Geschwind and his colleagues (1995) offer 
a case report of a 68-year-old woman suffering from a transient alien hand syndrome 
caused by a stroke limited only to the middle and posterior portions of the body of 
the corpus callosum: 
On postoperative day 11, she was noted by nursing staff to have left-sided weakness 
and difficulty walking. According to her family, she had complained of loss of control 
of her left hand for the previous three days, as if the hand were performing on its 
own. She awoke several times with her left hand choking her, and while she was 
awake, her left hand would unbutton her gown, crush cups on her tray, and fight with 
the right hand while she was answering the phone. To keep her left hand from doing 
mischief, she would subdue it with the right hand. She described this unpleasant 
situation as if someone “from the moon” were controlling her hand. (Geschwind et al. 
1995: 803)12 
 
In this case the functional correlate of representational shift is likely to have been an 
interhemispheric motor disconnection, whereas the neural correlate of this functional 
                                                 
12 I am indebted to Andreas Kleinschmidt for useful advice with regard to relevant literature and possible 
interpretations of data. 
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deficit was a rather circumscribed lesion in the midbody of the corpus callosum. On 
the representational level we see that the triggering events leading to a certain subset 
of contradictory, but impressively complex and very obviously goal-directed, 
patterns of motor behavior, cannot be depicted as my own volitional acts anymore. In 
other words, the information about these events taking place within the system 
cannot be integrated into the phenomenal self-model. It is no longer globally 
available information for the system, either as a property of the world or as a 
property of the system itself. Therefore these action-generating events are – from the 
patient’s perspective – not part of her phenomenal biography anymore. Only the 
visually and proprioceptively represented arm movements themselves are endowed 
with phenomenal subjectivity in the sense of ownership. They are, however, not 
subjective in the sense of phenomenal agenthood. Again, what is missing is a certain 
integrative capacity: the capacity to integrate a representation of the causal history of 
certain motor commands into the phenomenal self-model. (Note the implicit parallels 
to the discussions of schizophrenia in Daprati et al. 1997; Georgieff and Jeannerod 
1998). On the functional level this loss is possibly mirrored in the loss of 
interhemispheric integration of motor and supplementary motor areas (Geschwind et 
al. 1995: 807). 
! Hemi-neglect and other attention disorders seem to present an especially 
interesting case: You have an active self-representational structure, parts of which 
cannot be “read out” by higher-order attentional processes. Therefore you do not 
have a phenomenal self-model of this region in state-space; information already 
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contained in the system is not available under what the philosopher might want to 
call an internal context or an “ego-mode of presentation” (Newen 1997:117). 
Attention is important in constituting phenomenal content. Bernard Baars and David 
Chalmers have repeatedly pointed out that “global availability” may be one of the 
central functional criteria to mark out active phenomenal information (see Baars 
1988; Chalmers 1997). I think that given the material from psychophysics and 
neuropsychology, we need to differentiate this concept into at least three 
subcategories: attentional availability, cognitive availability, and volitional availability. 
In alien hand syndrome you seem to have a deficit that destroys volitional 
availability, but not attentional or cognitive availability. In hemi-neglect, however, 
attentional unavailability of information contained in an existing self-model can lead 
to a loss of cognitive availability (as in confabulatory activity and in anosognosia) 
and volitional availability (as in paralysis). There are of course generalized versions 
of this type of deviant phenomenal self-modeling. 
One also has to do justice to situations in which certain layers of the self-model seem 
to be extended to the very border of the global model of reality. 
! In some cases of mania or during certain religious experiences, the patient (or the 
mystic) is convinced that all events he experiences as taking place in the world are 
caused by his own volitional acts.  
Philosophically speaking, the implicit ontology underlying these states is a 
Platonistic version of solipsism: All causation is mental causation, and there is only 
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one causal agent in the world.13 From a representationalist perspective we clearly 
                                                 
 28
seem to be confronted with a hypertrophy of self-representation: External events are 
endowed with phenomenal agenthood because their causal history is represented as 
an internal part of the system itself. 14  One may therefore speculate that the 
corresponding functional correlate must consist in a dedifferentiation of the 
integrational mechanism, which embeds some event representations into the 
currently active self-model while constantly excluding others. To my knowledge, 
nothing about the neural correlates realizing such a pathological function is known 
to date. 
Let us take a look at the second target property. 
 
The Property of Selfhood Phenomenal selfhood is what makes us an experiential 
subject. In German the property in question has sometimes been called präreflexive 
Selbstvertrautheit (prereflexive self-intimacy; e.g., Frank 1991). It is a very basic and 
seemingly spontaneous, effortless way of inner acquaintance, of “being in touch with 
yourself,” a fundamental form of non-conceptual self-knowledge that precedes any 
higher forms of cognitive self-consciousness. In fact, this basic form of primitive self-
awareness is what makes quasi-propositional and conceptually mediated forms of 
self-consciousness possible, by preventing them from becoming circular and empty 
(Bermúdez 1995; Metzinger 1993). From a representationalist perspective it clearly 
must be the result of an ongoing subsymbolic dynamics: the existence of a single, 
coherent, and temporally extended self-representation forming the center of the 
global representational state. The resulting centeredness of the overall representational 
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state, however, is a functional property (to which I will come back later). If the 
representational module I just mentioned is damaged or disintegrates, or if multiple 
structures of this type alternate in the system or are simultaneously active, different 
neuropsychological syndromes or altered states result.  
Here are some brief examples: 
! Anosognosias and anosodiaphorias: loss of higher-order insight into an existing 
deficit, as in blindness denial (Anton’s Syndrome). This extensive and well-
documented class of disorders is theoretically relevant, because it falsifies the 
“epistemic transparency” assumption, under which many classical theories of 
subjectivity have operated: There exist unnoticed and unnoticeable forms of mis(self-
)representation, because large portions of the subsymbolic self-model seem to be 
cognitively and introspectively impenetrable (see also section “The Central 
Theoretical Problem on the Representational Level of Discription,” below). 
! Dissociative identity disorder (DID; for diagnostic features, see DSM-IV: 300.14). 
The system uses different and alternating self-models to functionally adapt to 
extremely traumatizing or socially inconsistent situations. On the phenomenal level 
this results in the presence of two or more distinct “identities” or personality states, 
and sometimes in asymmetric amnesias.  
Since I cannot enter an extended discussion of this specific class of phenomenal states 
here, 15  I only want to draw readers’ attention to two important points that 
demonstrate the explanatory power of the naturalized representationalist approach 
as opposed to classical philosophical theories of subjectivity. First, it is of course well 
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conceivable that a system generates a number of different self-models which are 
functionally incompatible, and therefore modularized. They nevertheless could be 
internally coherent, each endowed with its own characteristic phenomenal content 
and behavioral profile. Second, this does not have to be a pathological situation. 
Operating under different self-models in different situational contexts may be 
biologically as well as socially adaptive. Don’t we all to some extent use multiple 
personalities to cope efficiently with different parts of our lives? 
! “Ich-Störungen” 16  are a large class of psychiatric disorders accompanied by 
changes in the conscious experience of one’s own identity. (For useful conceptual 
discussions and a number of case studies, see, e.g., Halligan and Marschall 1996.) 
In these cases, the phenomenal self starts to disintegrate. Schizophrenia and DID are 
examples, as are depersonalization disorders. Self-models can lack information or 
become multiplied. They also can lose internal coherence. Phenomenological data 
from clinical neuropsychology and cognitive neuropsychiatry show that the internal 
correlation strength between the set of properties which is being depicted in the 
mode of phenomenal self-representation can vary greatly. If the phenomenal self-
model, as I propose, at any given moment is a unified representation that can also 
dissolve or disintegrate, then there might of course be something like a gradient of 
coherence for this structure. In principle some metric for the internal coherence of a 
self-model should exist. Once the neural correlate of the phenomenal self-model in 
humans can be described in sufficient detail, this observation will constitute an 
interesting target for formal modeling. 
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The Property of Perspectivalness The third and last phenomenal target property is 
“perspectivalness”: the existence of a single, coherent, and temporally stable model 
of reality that is representationally centered on a single, coherent, and temporally 
extended phenomenal subject. A phenomenal subject is a model of the system as 
experiencing. 17  To analyze perspectivalness, a second theoretical entity has to be 
introduced: “the phenomenal model of the intentionality-relation,” i.e., an ongoing, 
dynamical representation of the system as currently interacting with an object-
component (see section “Step 5” and chapter 7, this volume). This structural feature of 
the global representational space leads to the instantiation of a temporally extended, 
non-conceptual, first-person perspective. Again, if this global structural feature is 
lost, phenomenology changes and different neuropsychological disorders or classes 
of certain altered states emerge. Here are two last examples of  situations in which 
conscious experience seems to remain while no longer being phenomenologically 
subjective experience. In these configurations the first-person perspective has been 
dissolved: 
! Complete depersonalization (see DSM-IV: 300.6): loss of the phenomenal first-
person perspective, accompanied by dysphoric states and functional deficits 
(Angstvolle Ich-Auflösung, “dreadful ego-dissolution”; see Dittrich 1985). 
! Mystical states and religious experiences: selfless and noncentered global states 
that are later described and “autobiographically experienced” as nonpathological 
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and nonthreatening (Ozeanische Selbstentgrenzung, “oceanic boundary loss”; see 
Dittrich 1985; “The Great View from Nowhere”). 
The interesting insight at this point seems to be that there is in fact something like  
phenomenologically nonsubjective consciousness (see footnote 6). Obviously a full-
blown theory of mind will have to do justice to the full spectrum of phenomenal 
states undergone by human beings. Mystical experiences as well as fully 
depersonalized pathological situations are important elements of this spectrum. The 
major epistemological obstacle in turning such states – be they pathological or 
spiritual – into explananda for neuroscientific research lies in the logical 
contradiction inherent in all reports from a purportedly autobiographical type of 
memory. The self-contradictory nature of such reports makes them a very doubtful 
source of information from a methodological perspective. I will now consider the 
two most important objections to the approach sketched in this paper. 
 
The Central Theoretical Problem on the Functional Level of Description 
 
The obvious criticism at this point is: This analysis does not do full justice to the 
phenomenology of self-consciousness, and it also cannot help us in understanding 
why a self-representation can be used as the immovable center of an egocentric 
world model in a purely functional sense. To take the phenomenology seriously 
means doing justice to the fact that the first-person perspective is always privileged 
among all other perspectives, which may be mentally represented in my conscious 
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space as well.18  In what way does the phenomenal self-model differ from all other 
currently active phenomenal models, be they models of objects or models of other 
persons? Which functional property marks out its special role in the informational 
architecture of the system, and exactly how does it become the stable center, not only 
of phenomenal but of behavioral space as well? 
Here is my answer: The self-model is the only representational structure that is 
anchored in the brain by a continuous source of internally generated input. Whenever 
conscious experience (i.e., the activation of a stable, integrated model of reality) takes 
place at all, this continual source of internal, proprioceptive input exists as well. The 
body is always there, and although its relational properties in space and in 
movement constantly change, the body is the only coherent perceptual object that 
constantly generates input. If one treats the many different internal sources of 
information flowing from tactile, visceral, vestibular, and other proprioceptors 
within the body as one single sensory modality, one arrives at an interesting 
conclusion: Body perception is unique not only from an epistemological, but also 
from a functional perspective, in that it has only one singular object ever (see Martin 
1995; Bermúdez 1998: chapter. 6). And this elementary body percept will always 
contain a subvolume, which is unique in that it integrates a region of maximal 
invariance into phenomenal state-space, a region which is generated from an 
information flow originating exclusively in internal transducers and which is strictly 
stimulus-correlated. I call this stimulus-correlated part of the self-model a self-
presentation (see Metzinger 1993, 1997), because it makes fine-grained information 
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available to the system that, according to my hypothesis, can be presented, but not re-
presented.19 The self-model becomes the functional center of representational as well 
as of behavioral space, because its purely presentational basis contributes to the only 
perceptual object that is permanently stimulus-correlated. Within that object we have 
something like a “background ‘buzz’ of somatosensory input” (Kinsbourne 1995: 
217), which on the subcognitive level of phenomenal experience enables us to feel 
ourselves as continuously embodied and as present within a subjective now. 
This answer to the functionalist question posed above immediately leads to testable 
hypotheses, because it makes the step from functional to neural correlates possible. 
If, e.g., it is really true that the constant activity of that part of the neuromatrix of the 
spatial model of one’s own body, which is independent of external input, becomes 
the center of experiential space by forming an invariant background of bodily 
awareness, then this constitutes an empirical hypothesis. Of course, as a philosopher 
I should now definitely step back and refrain from any dilettante, amateurish 
speculation. However, let me draw my readers’ attention to the fact that new results 
concerning research on pain experience in phantom limbs may point to the existence 
of a genetically determined neuromatrix, the input-independent activation pattern of 
which could form the functional basis of the most invariant partitions in the 
phenomenal body image (“phylomatrix of the body-schema”; see Melzack 1989, 
1990, 1992; Melzak et al. 1997; for a possible more fundamental, but compatible 
approach see also Damasio 1994, 1999; Damasio and Damasio 1996a, b).  
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Of course, one might think that the elementary body percept is consolidated in social 
interactions only after birth, or during earlier motor behavior in the womb.20 On the 
other hand, a persistent functional link between regions of primary somatosensory 
cortex and certain regions in the bodily self-model is proven by direct electrical 
stimulation during neurosurgical operations under local anesthesia (see Melzack et 
al. 1997). Of course, sensory body and motor maps are highly plastic and subject to 
the influence of experience even in the adult organism. And, of course, one has to see 
that there is probably no such thing as absolute invariance or functional rigidity. But 
there is good evidence for some kind of innate “body prototype,” as can, for instance, 
be seen from the phantom sensations reported by some phocomelic children, who are 
born without one or more limbs. It seems that these data show that even people born 
without limbs develop complex bodily self-models which sometimes include limbs – 
even if there never has been a source of input. 
Melzack’s case studies provide convincing evidence that phantom limbs are 
experienced by at least 20 percent of congenitally limb-deficient subjects and by 50 
percent of those who underwent amputations before the age of six years. If all of the 
congenital cases failed to have phantom experiences, it would be plausible that all 
self-modeling is only experientially based, but taken together with the fact that some 
of these patients do not lose the relevant parts of their phenomenal self-model even 
as adults, these cases seem to constitute plausible evidence that the neural correlate 
of the spatial model of the self is partly immune to local neuroplasticity in the 
somatosensory cortex. Melzack also points to numerous cases in which excision of 
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the somatosensory cortex did not prevent the reappearance of a phantom limb at 
follow-up. Therefore the neural correlate of self-consciousness (NCSC) must be 
highly distributed.21 In an earlier publication, Melzack writes: 
In essence, I postulate that the brain contains a neuromatrix, or network of neurons, 
that, in addition to responding to sensory stimulation, continuously generates a 
characteristic pattern of impulses indicating that the body is intact and unequivocally 
one's own. I call this pattern a neurosignature. If such a matrix operated in the absence 
of sensory inputs from the periphery of the body, it would create the impression of 
having a limb even when that limb has been removed (1992: 93). 
 
Again, I do not want to indulge in any amateurish speculation at this point. On the 
level of conceptual analysis my answer to the first problem is that the self-model is 
the only active representational structure in the system which is functionally 
anchored in a continuous, internally generated source of input. If this is correct, there 
should be many empirical routes to successfully take the step from the functional to 
the neural correlates of preconceptual self-consciousness. 
 
The Central Theoretical Problem on the Representational Level of Description 
 
Step 3: Transparency and Naive Realism 
The antireductionist reply to the theoretical model sketched in this essay is obvious 
and straightforward. There seems to be no necessary connection between the 
functional and representational basis properties and the phenomenal target 
properties of “mineness,” “selfhood,” and “perspectivalness.” Everything described 
so far could, of course, happen without the instantiation of the phenomenal 
properties of “mineness,” “selfhood,” and “perspectivalness.” It is conceivable, a 
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property dualist might argue, that a biological information-processing system opens 
a centered representational space and then always embeds a model of itself into the 
model of reality active within this space without automatically generating a 
phenomenal self. An active, dynamical “self-model” still is just a representation of 
the system; it is a system model – not an instance of genuine self-consciousness. In 
order for the functional property of centeredness to contribute to the phenomenal 
property of perspectivalness, the model of the system has to become a phenomenal 
self. From a philosophical point of view the cardinal question is What is needed – by 
conceptual necessity – to make a phenomenal first-person perspective emerge from a 
representational space that is already functionally centered? In short, how do you get 
from the functional property of “centeredness” and the representational property of 
“self-modeling” to the phenomenal property of “selfhood”? 
The answer lies in what one might call the “semantic transparency” of the data 
structures used by the system. Terminological details22 aside, the general idea is that 
the representational vehicles23 employed by the system are transparent in the sense 
that they do not contain the information that they are models on the level of their 
content (see Metzinger 1993; Van Gulick 1988a, 1988b). In our present context 
“transparency” means that: we are systems which are not able to recognize their own 
representational instruments as representational instruments. That is why we “look 
through” those representational structures, as if we were in direct and immediate 
contact with their content, with what they represent for us (see also row 2 of table 
20.1). 
Again, one may move downwards and speculate about certain functional properties 
of the internal instruments the system uses to represent the world and itself to itself. 
A simple functional hypothesis might say that the respective data structures are 
activated in such a fast and reliable way that the system itself is not able to recognize 
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them as such any more (e.g., because of a lower temporal resolution of 
metarepresentational processes; see, e.g., Metzinger 1995c). This can then be 
supplemented by a plausible teleofunctionalist assumption: For biological systems 
like ourselves – who always had to minimize computational load and find simple but 
viable solutions – naive realism was a functionally adequate “background 
assumption” to achieve reproductive success. In short, there has been no 
evolutionary pressure on our representational architecture to overcome the naive 
realism inherent in semantic transparency. The decisive step of my argument consists 
in applying this point to the self-model. 
 
Step 4: Autoepistemic Boundedness 
Let us take stock. So far we have taken three steps in our investigation: First, the self-
model was introduced as a theoretical entity. Second, we make a brief 
representationalist analysis of the target properties possible. Third, we then 
introduced an empirically highly plausible assumption regarding the nature of many 
phenomenal representations, the transparency assumption. We now have two more 
steps, both of which are decisive. The first consists in applying the transparency 
assumption to the self-model and thereby solving the homunculus problem. 
We are systems that are not able to recognize their subsymbolic self-model as a 
model. For this reason we are permanently operating under the conditions of a 
“naive-realistic self-misunderstanding”: We experience ourselves as constantly being 
in direct and immediate epistemic contact with ourselves. What we have in the past 
simply called a „self” is not a non-physical individual, but only the content of an 
ongoing, dynamical process – the process of transparent self-modeling. Any system 
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that, because of its functional architecture, is not able to recognize its self-generated 
subconceptual representation of itself as a representation, will inevitably fall into a 
naive-realistic relationship toward the content of this representation. 24  On the 
representationalist level of analysis, this clearly seems to be a conceptual necessity. 
And as an empirical assumption about the way our brain actually works, it is highly 
plausible. A prereflexive phenomenal self, therefore, emerges if a system operates 
under a model of reality centered by a transparent self-model. 
 
Step 5: The Phenomenal Model of the Intentionality Relation 
The last step consists in applying the transparency constraint to the internal 
representation of the relation between subject and perceptual object, to the relation 
between agent and goal. If, for instance, the phenomenal model of one’s own 
perceptual states contains a transparent representation of their causal history, then 
inevitably convolved global states will result, the content of which can only be 
truthfully described by the system itself as (e.g.) “I myself  [= the content of a 
transparent self-model] am now seeing this object [= the content of a transparent 
object representation], and I am seeing it with my own eyes” [= the simple story about 
immediate sensory perception, which sufficed for the brain’s evolutionary purposes]. 
The phenomenal self is a virtual agent perceiving virtual objects in a virtual world. 
This agent doesn’t know that it possesses a visual cortex, and it does not know what 
electromagnetic radiation is: It just sees “with its own eyes” – by, as it were, 
effortlessly directing its visual attention. This virtual agent does not know that it 
possesses a motor system which, for instance, needs an internal emulator for fast, 
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goal-driven reaching movements. It just acts “with its own hands.” It doesn’t know 
what a sensorimotor loop is – it just effortlessly enjoys what researchers in the field 
of virtual reality design call “full immersion,” which for them is still a distant goal. 
To achieve this global effect, what is needed is a dynamic and transparent subject-
object relation that episodically integrates the self-model and those perceptual objects 
which cause the changes in its content by telling an internal story about how these 
changes came about. This story does not have to be the true story; it may well be a 
greatly simplified internal confabulation that has proven to be functionally adequate. 
Based on the arguments given above, I claim that phenomenal subjectivity emerges 
precisely at this stage: As soon as the system transparently models itself as an 
epistemic or causal agent, you have a transparent representation of episodic subject-
object relations. For philosophers, of course, the new distinction of phenomenal 
intentionality as opposed to unconscious processes bearing intentional content will 
not be too surprising a move. It certainly is exciting that we presently witness this 
notion surfacing at the frontier of neuroscientific theory formation as well (see, e.g., 
Damasio 1994, 1999; Damasio and Damasio 1996a: 172, 1996b: 24; chapter 7, this 
volume; Delacour 1997: 138; LaBerge 1997: 150, 172).  
Why would a concise research program for the neural correlate of self-consciousness 
(the NCSC) be of highest relevance for understanding phenomenal experience? If all 
the above is true (or if it at least points in the right direction), then it should prove to 
be more than heuristically fruitful. The vast majority of phenomenal states are 
subjective states in the way I have just analyzed: Not only are they elements of a 
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coherent internal model of reality used by the system; not only are they activated 
within a window of presence; not only does their phenomenal content supervene 
entirely on internal functional and physical properties; but they are bound into a 
transparently centered representational space. The maximally salient focus of 
conscious experience will always be constituted by the object-component of the 
phenomenal model of the intentionality-relation, with the subject-component, the 
self-model, providing a source of invariance and stability. If I am correct – and that is 
what it actually means when one says that such states are subjective states – then a 
straightforward empirical prediction will follow: Under standard conditions a very 
large class of phenomenal states should become episodically integrated with the 
current self-model on a very small time scale, as attention, as volition, as cognition 
wander around in representational space, selecting ever new object-components for 
the conscious first-person perspective. Global availability of information means 
availability for transient, dynamical integration into the currently active self-model, 
generating a “self in the act of knowing.” In other words, the self-model theory of 
subjectivity can serve to mark out a specific and highly interesting class of neural 
correlates of consciousness. 
And that is why the NCSC is important: Only if we find the neural and functional 
correlates of the phenomenal self will we be able to discover a more general 
theoretical framework into which all data can fit. Only then will we have a chance to 
understand what we are actually talking about when we say that phenomenal 
experience is a subjective phenomenon. It is for this reason that I have introduced two 
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new theoretical entities in this chapter, the notion of a “transparent self-model” and 
the concept of the “phenomenal model of the intentionality-relation.” Two 
predictions are associated with them. First, if – all other constraints held constant – 
the self-model of a conscious system would become fully opaque, then the 
phenomenal target property of experiential “selfhood” would disappear. Second, if 
the phenomenal model of the intentionality-relation collapses or cannot be sustained 
in a given conscious system, phenomenal states may exist, but will not be 
experientially subjective states any more, because the phenomenal first-person 
perspective has disappeared in this system. Intentionality-modeling is a necessary 
condition for perspectivalness. 
In conclusion, let me once again illustrate the central thought of the argument by a 
metaphor. Interestingly, the point of this metaphor is that it contains a logical 
mistake: We are systems which were configured by evolution in such a way that they 
constantly confuse themselves with the content of their phenomenal self-model. In 
other words, we are physical systems that on the level of phenomenal representation are 
not able to differentiate between themselves and the content of their currently active 
self-model. We know ourselves only under a representation, and we are not able to 
subjectively represent this very fact. The evolutionary advantage of the underlying 
dynamical process of constantly confusing yourself with your own self-model is 
obvious: It makes a selfless biological system egotistic by generating a very robust 
self-illusion. Now here is the logical mistake: Whose illusion could that be? It makes 
sense to speak of truth and falsity, of knowledge and illusion, only if you already 
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have an epistemic agent in the sense of a system possessing conceptualized 
knowledge in a strong propositional sense. But this is not the case: We have just 
solved the homunculus problem; there is nobody in there who could be wrong about 
anything. All you have is a functionally grounded self-modeling system under the 
condition of a naive-realistic self-misunderstanding. So, if you would really want to 
carry this metaphor even further, what I have been saying in this paper is that the 
conscious self is an illusion which is no one’s illusion.  
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